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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we specify and estimate a nested logit model and use 
it to analyze housing choice behaviour in the Netherlands. 
Households are assumed to deelde first whether they want to continue 
their present housing situation or move to a rented or 
owner-occupied dwelling. when they choose one of the latter two 
possibilities, they have to choose a particular type of dwelling. 
The model presented in this paper is specified in such a way that 
the whole decision- making process is consistent with utility 
maximization. Empirically it turns out that the resistance against 
making a move is very strong. 
Since the Dutch housing market is characterized by strong and 
persistent excess demand and government control we have tried to 
incorporate the effects of the disequilibrium situation in our 
model. It turns out that queueing is a very important pheneomenon 
and that households are willing to wait for a dwelling of their most 
preferred type for a long period (more than a year) 
In the model we have tried to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
within the dwelling types that have been distinguished by using the 
price (rent) associated with a dwelling as an indicator of its 
quality. 
The results of the estimation are satisfactory. 
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Specification and Estimation of a Logit Model for Housing Choice in 
* 
the Netherlands . 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we will specify a nested logit model and use it to 
analyze housing choice behaviour. The model is estimated for data 
concerning the Dutch Rimcity. Since there have been many attempts in 
recent years to use discrete choice models, and especially the logit 
model, for the analysis of housing choice (see Clark and Van 
Lierop[1986] for a review of this research) we will in this 
introduction mention a few points in which our analysis seems to 
differ from other approaches that have been reported in the 
literature. We will mention three points. 
First, we have tried to build a model that can - as a whole - be 
considered as being consistent with utility maximizing behaviour. In 
this we differ from many others who have used the maximization 
paradigm for the analysis of the choice of the particular type of 
dwelling, but adopted a satisficing approach for the analysis of the 
decision to move or to stay. We will show that it is possible to 
model the whole decision process in a way that is compatible with 
utility maximization when the generalized costs of mobility (or : 
the resistance against making a move) is taken into account in a 
general way. 
Second, we have tried to take into account the persistent state of 
disequilibrium of the Dutch housing market. This disequilibrium is 
apparent from the large number of households willing to move as 
compared to the relatively small number of realized moves (see 
VROM[1983]). The excess-demand is dealt with by means of some 
queueing system, which gives a priority treatment to households 
which are considered to be especially in need of another dweiling. 
The disequilibrium may be expected to have two effects. There will 
be some queueing for the dweiling types for which there is excess 
demand. On the other hand, households may decide to choose a 
second-best alternative when there is excess- demand for dweling 
type that is most preferred by them because they have to wait for a 
long time before they can realize a move to such a dweiling. In the 
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model that will be specified below we have tried to incorporate 
these two effects. 
Third, we have tried to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity 
that is usually present in even the finest possible classification 
of the housing stock and that is apparent from (large) variations in 
the prices of houses that do not differ in the characteristics on 
which the researcher has Information. We will try to take this 
effect into account by using the price associated with a dweiling as 
an indication of its quality. 
The paper is built up as follows. In section 2 we present a short 
overview of the complete nested model. In section 3 we deal with the 
unobserved heterogeneity. In section 4 we discuss the data set. In 
section 5 we ewxamine the adaptations to the logit model that are 
necessary to deal with the disequilibrium situation. In section 6 we 
present some figures concerning the tension between intebded and 
realized moves. In section 7 we specify the model and provide 
estimates for its coefficients. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Overview of the Model. 
The usual methodology for modelling choice behaviour on the 
housing market consists of subdividing the analysis into two stages. 
In the first stage the population is separated in movers and 
stayers, while in the second stage the destination choice of the 
movers is examined. In both stages of the analysis the influence of 
discrete choice models (logit , probit) has been profound in recent 
years. One of the advantages of these models is that they can be 
interpreted as the outcome of a utility maximizing procedure. 
Especially for the second stage of the relocation analysis this 
interpretation has been judged as being very useful. This stepwise 
procedure (see e.g., van Lierop[1986] and Rima and van Wissen[1988] 
for some recent examples concerning the Dutch housing market) is 
also employed in the model to be formulated in this paper. 
Two stages of household decision making will be distinguished. The 
first one concerns the decision whether to continue living in the 
present dwelling or to move to a rented or an owner-occupied 
dweiling. In the second step the household chooses a specific 
dwelling type. We will try to model the decision - making in both 
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Figure 10.1 The Decision Tree for Housing Choices. 
continue move 
the present to a rented 
situation dweiling 
16 dweiling types 
move 
to an owner-occupied 
dweiling 
K 
11 dweiling types 
steps in a way that is consistent with utility maximization 
bahaviour. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the model. 
The basic tooi of analysis for our empirical investigation is the 
logit model. This model can be interpreted as the result of utility 
maximization when the Utilities that are attached to each of the 
alternatives that can be chosen consist of the sum of a 
deterministic and a random term, the latter being (type I) extreme 
value distributed (see e.g., McFadden[1971]). The probability that a 
particular alternative n will be chosen can be written as : 
v 
n 
n N v , V n 
n'=l 
(1) 
n=l,...,N 
where N is the total number of choice alternatives , and v is the 
n 
systematic part of the utility attached to alternative n. Three 
submodels of the form (1) will be estimated in this paper. One 
referring to the choice of the dweiling type of households that are 
willing to move to a rented dwelling ; one referring to the choice 
of the dwelling type for households that are willing to move to an 
owner-occupied dwelling and one referring to the choice between 
continuation of the present situation and making a move to a rented 
or an owner-occupied dwelling. Some peculiarities of these submodels 
will be dealt with in later sections of the paper. 
Throughout the chapter attention will be directed towards the 
4 
understanding of the influences of allocation variables - prices and 
rationing - on the choice behaviour of individual households. This 
implies that - in comparison - less attention is devoted to other 
explanatory variables which are of potential importance. For 
instance , for the number of rooms and the type of dwelling (single 
family unit or apartment) only simple specifications will be used. 
Other variables , e.g. , the age of the head of the household (which 
may be expected to have some influence on the propensity to move) 
and the region in which one looks for a dweiling (which may restrict 
the set of available dwelling types : in the centre of a large city 
single family dwellings are hard to find) are completely absent in 
our analysis. It should therefore be clear from the outset that we 
are not looking for the ultimate model of choice behaviour on the 
Dutch housing market , but seek to reach the much more modest goal 
of understanding the influences of the allocation variables, prices 
and realization probabilities, somewhat better. The relevance of 
this should be clear from the fact that economists stress the role 
of these variables , while in empirical work they usually play a 
minor role. This can be illustrated by three recently completed 
studies of the Dutch housing market. In Van Lierop[1986] 
price-quality and income-housing costs ratios play a role in the 
determination of the willingness to move. Only the former ratio 
plays a role in the model explaining the probabilities of actual 
moving for those willing to move , and neither of both play a role 
in the choice of the dwelling type. Also in his models the regulated 
character of a large part of the Dutch housing market does not 
explicitly influence the decision-making of the individual actors 
(implicitly it is of course incorporated in the discrepancies 
between willingness to move and actual moving behaviour). In of Rima 
and van Wissen[1988]'s study much attention is paid to the regulated 
character of the market and the discrepancies between choices and 
realizations this implies. However, prices and incomes are 
completely absent in the models for household relocation estimated 
by them. Finally, a recent study by Scholten[1988] adopts a vacancy 
chain approach in which the recruitment patterns of new residents • 
for dwellings that have become vacant are assumed to be constant 
over time. This implies that neither income and prices, nor 
5 
rationing mechanisms play an explicit role in his model. The 
usefulness of this model in situations where the prices of dwellings 
or the composition of the housing stock or the population of 
households changes significantly may therefore be dqubted . 
The fact that variables which are indicated by the theory to be of 
great importance for the allocation process are nevertheless 
neglected so often in empirical work gives rise to the conjecture 
that it will not be easy to incorporate these variables in models 
which are of practical use , i.e. , in models whose coefficients 
have been estimated and have the expected sign and that can be used 
for policy evaluation. Indeed , it turned out to be the case that 
careful modelling was necessary in order to arrive at interpretable 
results. This will become clear in the following sections. 
3 Unobserved Heterogeneity of Dwelling Types. 
3.1 Introduction. 
In empirical research one often classifies various kinds of 
dwellings into a relatively small number of groups which are then 
viewed as homogeneoous even though this assumption is not 
(completely) justified. Often there still exists a considerable 
amount of unobserved heterogeneity within the dweiling types. This 
is apparent from variations in the prices that have to be paid for 
dwellings which are of the same type. In the present section we will 
look at some of the consequences of this heterogeneity within 
groups. 
3.2 The Influence on Utility 
As a start , we consider a situation in which all relevant 
characteristics of a dweiling are known except one. The first 
question we intend to answer concerns the relation between the 
indirect utility attached to a particular alternative n , U , and 
the value s of the unobserved variable. This variable , which could 
be any unobserved characteristic of possible relevance (e.g. , the 
existence of shops or schools in the neighbourhood or the age of the 
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dwelling) i., assumed to be continuous. Suppressing all other 
arguments of the indirect utility function U , we may write : 
n n 
We would like to know the shape of this function. 
It will be assumed that households prefer a larger value of s to a 
lower one. This implies that the direct utility of occupying a 
dweiling of type n , U , is increasing in s , but also that 
households are , ceteris paribus , willing to pay a higher rent for 
a dweiling with a higher value of s. This implies that the price p 
will be a function of s and that variations in the latter variable 
can be observed indirectly by the researcher as variations in the 
value of the former : 
P - P (s) . (3) 
rn rn 
The relation (3) causes a second indirect effect on utility : the 
rise in the price p associated with the rise in the value of s 
causes an increase in p that counteracts the positive direct effect 
of the increase in s. 
In order to see what the total effect of an increase in s on the 
value of the indirect utility U will be , we consider a household 
J
 n 
that has already decided to choose a dweiling of type n , and is 
able to rent a dwelling with a value s of the unobserved variable 
associated with it. It will maximize its direct conditional utility 
function U : 
n 
U - U (s , q) , (4) 
n n -
where q is the vector of consumption goods other than housing , 
subject to a budget constraint : 
y = Pn(s) + u-q • (5) 
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This maximization gives rise to conditional demand functions q, : 
qk = qk ( y" pn (^ ' ^  ' ( 6 ) 
k=l,...,K , 
which may be substituted in the conditional utility function (4) in 
order to arrive at a conditional indirect utility function : 
U*(s , y-p(s) , u) . (7) 
Assuming the values of y and u to be constant , this is the desired 
form (2). Let us see how the utility value U will change as a 
consequence of a change in the value s : 
I - K air/as - au/as - o P /as), s au/aq, .aqi/a(y-p) . (8) XI Tl il -, -, K. K. Tl k-l 
In this equation the first term on the right-hand side embodies the 
direct effect of an increase in s on the utility experienced by the 
household, while the second one concerns the indirect effect that 
occurs through the decrease in the possibilities to buy other 
consumption goods as a consequence of the increase in the price p . 
If the household were completely free in the choice of s, it would 
choose the value of this variable in such a way that the expression 
in (8) became equal to zero. Assuming that the marginal Utilities of 
all goods 1,...,K and of s are positive but decreasing and that the 
value of 3p /3s is non-decreasing in s, we would expect that for 
small values of s the first term on the right-hand side exceeds the 
second one, while for high values of s the reverse would be the 
case. One would therefore expect the function U (s) to be increasing 
for small values of s, to reach a maximum and to be decreasing 
afterwards. Such a function is pictured in the north-east quadrant 
of figure 2. 
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3.3 The Relation Between Utility and Rent 
In the usual case (i.e. , without unobserved heterogeneity) the 
conditional indirect utility U is a decreasing function of the rent 
J
 n ° 
p . The upshot of the discussion above is that this relation may be 
disturbed as a consequence of hidden within-class heterogeneity and 
that the actual relation between conditional indirect utility and 
rent increases for relatively low values of the rent and decreases 
for relatively high values of the rent only. This has consequences 
for the specification of the utility function in empirical work. 
When it happens that different prices are observed for dweiling 
types that are the same as judged by their observed (non - price) 
characteristics, a formulation of the indirect utility function that 
is linear in the price of the dweiling may be expected to give 
misleading results. Then inste-ad a non-linear (e.g., parabolic) 
specification should be tried. 
When unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account the price 
plays a doublé role in the indirect utility function 
(i) in the usual way via the budget restriction and 
(ii) as an indicator of quality. 
It should therefore be expected that the relation between utility 
and price is different for households with different incomes. Also 
one may wonder whether the effects of a price increase on utility 
can still be separated from those of a change in the unobserved 
quality aspect. To this question we will return in section 8. 
Finally, it may be remarked that we still expect to find the same 
parabolic form of the relation between utility and rent when there 
is more than one unobserved variable. 
4 Discussion of the Data Set 
4.1 The Housing Needs Survey 
In the Netherlands a wide variety of housing market data is 
available , at both the local and the national levels. An important 
data set that has often been used for empirical research and policy 
Is the Dutch Housing Needs Survey (WoningBehoefte Onderzoek , 
abbreviated as WBO). This is a large (approximately 65,000 
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Figure 10.1 The expected relation between U , s and p . 
respondents) sample of the total Dutch population that is drawn 
every 4 years (e.g. , in 1981 and 1985). The material under 
consideration here sterns from 1981 (results for 1985 were not yet 
available). The interviewed persons were confronted with a large 
number of questions concerning their present and past housing 
situation, family conditions , age and socio-economie circumstances 
as well as about their plans to move to another dweiling in the near 
future (within 2 years). When a respondent indicated that he was 
considering such a move (approximately 25 % did so) , he was asked 
(among other questions) to what type of dweiling he would be willing 
to move (rented or owner-occupied), what the desired size of this 
dweiling would be and what price he expected he would have to pay 
for such a dwelling. The answers to these questions provided the 
basic material for the empirical work reported on below. 
These answers were interpreted in the following way. A person who 
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indicated that he was not considering a move was treated as one who 
viewed his present housing situation as optimal. A person who 
indicated he planned to move to a particular type of dweiling was 
assumed to have given his optimal choice alternative. Movers and 
stayers were assumed to have access to the same Information 
concerning relevant circumstances on the housing market. 
The price a person indicated he would be willing to pay was 
interpreted to be partly an indication for the quality of the 
dwelling concerned (see the previous section). Households with the 
same combination of (observed) characteristics and choosing for a 
dwelling of the same type (as defined by the values of observed 
dwelling characteristics) may nevertheless mention different prices 
because of (random) differences in the appreciation of unobserved 
characteristics. 
As is clear from the discussion above , our model is estimated on 
the basis of the stated preferences of the households concerned and 
not on actually observed moves. The main reason we have chosen for 
this approach is the strong government intervention on the Dutch 
housing market in general and especially on the segment of rented 
dwellings. Roughly 60% of the total Dutch housing stock consists of 
rented dwellings and approximately 80 % of these rented dwellings 
are under government control, usually indirectly in the form of 
locally organized housing cooperations. Usually the government sets 
the prices every year , while local institutions ration demand where 
necessary. Government measures may restrict the behaviour of 
households so that they are forced to move to a dwelling which is , 
at least from their point of view , suboptimal. By concentrating on 
preferred moves we have tried to evade the problems that would be 
associated with the incorporation of these additional restrictions. 
This does not exclude the possibility that households take into 
account the situation on the housing market when stating their 
preferences, but we will try to deal with this phenomenon by 
adopting a generalisation of the logit model (see section 5). 
4.2 The Classification of the Housing Stock 
Housing is a heterogeneous good and it is therefore necessary to 
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divide the housing stock into a number of classes which themselves 
can be considered as being approximately homogeneous. First of all, 
there are regional differences. For the Netherlands it is well known 
that these are significant (see e.g., Clark et al.[1986]), 
notwithstanding the small size of the country. We have tried to 
mitigate this problem by restricting our attention to the three 
western provinces North-Holland, South-Ho11and and Utrecht. These 
provinces contain the most densely populated part of the country, 
the so-called Rimcity. Housing market problems are mainly 
concentrated in this area. This is the reason why we have selected 
this part of the country. The administrative boundaries we have 
chosen are more or less arbitrary. On the one hand it may be said 
that they are too narrow since there is a lot of extra-regional 
commuting e.g., between Rotterdam and the western part of the 
province of North-Brabant and between Amsterdam and the province of 
Flevoland. On the other hand it may be remarked that the differences 
in the housing market conditions within the three western provinces 
are large, since they contain some large cities as well as areas 
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where agriculture is the dominant activity . 
For a classification of the housing stock within this area four 
dwelling characteristics were used : ownership, type (single family 
unit or apartment), number of rooms and price. The latter variable 
was used because the other three were insufficiënt to arrive at a 
classification for which the variations in the price within a class 
were small. Other variables (e.g., whether a rented dweiling was 
owned by a non-profit organisation, or whether the dweiling into 
which the household moves should be a new one) were not used, either 
because they were unavailable or because they were judged to be less 
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relevant . 
Ownership and type of a dwelling call for a classification into 
four types. The number of rooms was used for a subdivision of each 
of these into four more specific types of dwellings : those having 
one or two rooms, three rooms, four rooms or more than four rooms. 
For rented dwellings we distinguished furthermore dwellings with a 
low rent (below 250 guilders a month), those with a medium rent 
(between 250 and 450 guilders a month) and those with a high rent 
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Table 1 Classification of rented dwellings 
no. type nui r of rooms rent share (%) 
1,2,3 < 250 4.4 
1,2,3 250-450 1.6 
1,2,3 > 450 1.0 
4 < 250 8.8 
4 250-450 7.1 
4 > 450 3.3 
> 5 < 450 9.0 
> 5 > 450 5.3 
1,2 < 250 6.8 
1,2 > 250 5.2 
3 < 250 10.2 
3 250-450 6.0 
3 > 450 2.5 
> 4 < 250 8.5 
> 4 250-450 14.0 
> 4 > 450 6.2 
1 single family unit 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 apartment 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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(above 450 guilders a month). For owner-occupied dwellings an 
analogous classification was used : dwellings with a low value (less 
than 125,000 guilders), a medium value (125,000-175,000) and a high 
value (above 175,000) guilders have been distinguished. Use of these 
criteria gives rise to a classification of the dwelling stock into 
48 types. The number of dwellings of each type differed widely 
however and it was decided to cluster some of these classes together 
in order to arrive at a more useful classification. In tables 10.1 
and 10.2 this classification is shown. In our sample 63 % of the 
dwellings were rented and 37 % owner-occupied. 
The number of classes that have been distinguished is relatively 
large. It should be noted however that for classes that differ only 
in price we expect the coefficients of the utility functions to be 
the same, since we will try to deal with unobserved heterogeneity by 
means of the price differences (see the previous section). For this 
reason we have in effect distinguished 6 types of rented dwellings 
and 5 types of owner occupied dwellings. 
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value share (%) 
< 125,000 4.8 
> 125,000 2.7 
< 125,000 12.9 
125-175,000 10.3 
> 175,000 6.2 
< 125,000 8.5 
125-175,000 18.2 
> 175,000 23.2 
all 6.9 
< 125,000 4.2 
> 125,000 2.0 
Teble 2 Glassification of Owner-Occupied Dwellings 
no. type number of rooms 
1 single family unit 1,2,3 
2 ,, 1,2,3 
3 4 
4 4 
5 4 
6 > 5 
7 > 5 
8 > 5 
9 apartment 1,2,3 
10 > 4 
11 £ 4 
5 The Gonsequences of Disequilibrium. 
5.1 Introduction 
The persistent disequilibrium on the Dutch housing market may be 
expected to have some consequences for the observed choice 
frequencies.. When queueing occurs these frequencies will be biased 
since households that have chosen for a dweiling type for which 
excess-demand is particularly large have - on average - to wait 
longer and will therefore be overrepresented. On the other hand it 
may be expected that households that want to move to another 
dwelling within a reasonably short period avoid choosing the most 
heavily rationed types of dwellings and this will have opposite 
effects on the observed choice frequencies. In order to deal with 
these effects, it is likely that we have to adapt our logit model 
(1) to this situation. This issue will be discussed in the present 
section. 
5.2 A Model for Discrete Choice under Uncertainty. 
In Rouwendal[1988] a model is developed for the analysis of 
choices among a finite number of alternatives, when the realization 
of the alternative chosen is uncertain. This model may be relevant 
in markets that are not completely transparent. For instance, a 
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household may be searching on the housing market for a particular 
type of dweiling without being able to find one with certainty 
within a limited period of time. We will use this model as the 
starting point for our empirical analysis of choice behaviour in the 
Dutch housing market. 
The model is developed on the basis of three conditions. Two of 
these are motivated as straightforward consequences of the 
maximization of the expected utility of chosiing for a particular 
alternative, while the third is a variant of the 'independence of 
irrelevant alternatives' assumption which is fundamental for the 
logit model(see Strauss[1979]). Since we wanted to arrive at a model 
that would have as many of the convenient properties of the 
conventional multinomial logit model these conditions were 
considered to be appropriate. 
We consider an individual decision maker (a household) that has to 
choose one alternative out of N possible choices. His present 
* 
situation can be identified with one of these alternatives , say n . 
A choice for a particular alternative n gives a probability T/> that 
it will be realized. When the choice will not be realized the 
decision maker continuates his present situation. With respect to 
the housing market one may imagine a household that occupies a 
* 
dweiling of type n , is willing to move to a dweiling of type n , 
has a probability ij» of realizing this desire in the current period 
and continues living in his present dwelling when it is unabvle to 
do so. 
The model can be formulated as follows. The probability n. that 
household i will choose to move to a dweiling of type n is equal 
to : 
v 
n 
e 
ir. - A .— , (9) 
m n N v , 
V n ï e 
n'-l 
n-1,...,N , i-1,...,I , 
where I is the total number of households and A is a correction 
n 
term which is equal to 1 when n is the index of the dwelling 
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currently occupied by the household and equal to : 
v , 
g(V,n'Vn(i)}- E &n 
 u ;
 nVn(i) 
,1 ,., ^ n " v n ( i ) ) , 6 n nVn(i) 
n-1 N , n'*n(i) , 
otherwise. In this equation n(i) denotes the type of dwelling 
currently occupied by the household. 
The model is thus basically equal to the multinomial logit model 
(1) , with correction terms A for those alternatives for which 
n 
realization is uncertain. The function s,(ib ,v ,.,) should be 
° n n(i) 
increasing in rf> . This guarantees that alterntives with a relatively 
high realization probability get a higher choice probability than 
would be predicted by the multinomial logit model, while 
alternatives with a relatively low realization probability get a 
lower choice probability. The argument v ... gives the possibility 
to deal with possible effects of the initial situation on the 
behaviour towards risk. However, we will not use this possibility in 
our empirical work and shall therefore use the notation g(V> ). 
We will use the model described above for the analysis of choice 
bahaviour of households that are willing to move. This means that 
the alternative 'continuation of the present situation' can be left 
out of consideration. This gives us the possibility to reformulate 
4 
our models as follows : 
v 
g<tfn)-e n 
w . , (11) 
ni N v l g<*„,).e n 
n'-l n 
n=l,...,N 
When the function g(^ ) is specified in such a way that ln(g(V» )) is 
linear in the parameters to be estimated, the model of equation (11) 
can be used for empirical work in the same way as the conventional 
multinomial logit model. 
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5.3 Queueing and Uncertainty 
In the present subsection we will investigate the question whether 
or not the model presented in 5.2 can be used as a useful 
approximation to the choice behaviour of individual households on 
the housing market. The allocation system that is functioning in the 
housing market is not only characterized by uncertainty about the 
possibility to find dweiling of the most preferred type, but also by 
queuing effects, related to the allocation rules used by government 
departments and housing corporations. We therefore have to find out 
whether these queueing effects can be incorporated in the model 
presented in 5.2. 
At first sight one might be inclined to give a positive answer to 
the question whether that model developed can be used in situations 
of queueing. Uncertainty about the realization of the alternative 
chosen, apparent from a realization probability ip smaller than one 
implies an average waiting time equal to l/ij) . In this way a simple 
translation of the model from a situation of uncertainty about the 
realisation of the alternative chosen to one of queueing seems to be 
possible. 
A closer examination of this translation brings some difficulties 
to light. In the first place it may be expected that intertemporal 
considerations become of more importance in the case of pure 
queueing than in the case of uncertainty. In the latter case one 
only has to decide whether or not one should engage in a particular 
lottery in each period, while in the former case a decision for a 
number of periods (depending on the length of the queue) has to be 
taken. Discrepancies between choice behaviour in both situations 
may occur when significant changes in household characteristics have 
to be expected in the near future. In such a case it may be of great 
importance to move to another house at the right time while an 
immediate move would be suboptimal. Queueing allows for the 
possibility of timing, while stochastic rationing does not. 
Nevertheless, it may be expected that, in general, choice behaviour 
is not much different in both situations. 
5.4 Effects of Queueing on the Observed Choice Probabilities 
There may be another problem associated with the use of the model 
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presented above in situations where queueing occurs. This is caused 
by the fact that the choice situation of an individual household is 
influenced by the place it occupies in a particular queue. A 
household becomes more inclined to stick to a particular queue when 
it has already joined that queue for a number of periods. A change 
in the alternative chosen would imply that it has to start at the 
end of a different queue. This would imply an overrepresentation of 
the number of households joining a particular queue when their 
behaviour is analyzed by means of the model developed in chapter 3. 
In that model no such effects occur since every household whose 
chosen alternative has not been realized will, ceteris paribus, at 
the start of the next period be in the same decision situation as it 
was at the beginning of the current period. The effects of the 
changes in the decision situation caused by queueing are more or 
less comparable to those caused by serial correlation in the random 
terms of the utility functions. 
This effect of queueing counteracts that of avoidance of heavily 
rationed alternatives that is incorporated in the model developed in 
chapter 3. It may be reinforced by two additional possible effects. 
In the first place we cannot exclude the possibility that there 
existjs serial correlation among the error terms of the utility 
functions. In the present context serial correlation implies that 
people are inclined to stick to the alternative that was once 
chosen, even though it was not realized. When there is no rationing 
households will usually be searching for one period only, after that 
they will remain in their new dweiling for a number of periods. In 
that case the problem of serial correlation can be dealt with in 
another way (see section 7 below). When there is rationing however, 
it may be expected that a number of households is searching for a 
long period of time and also that some of these households are 
persistently searching for the same alternative. 
The second effect refers to unobserved heterogeneity within the 
groups of households (i.e., to what is sometimes called spurious 
state dependence , see Heckman(1980]). Consider e.g., the case in 
which there are two types of households and that one of these groups 
has a particularly strong preference for the n-th type of dwelling , 
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which has a low realization probability associated with it while the 
other has only a modest preference for this type of dwelling. Assume 
that the researcher has been unable to differentiate between the two 
groups and that they are treated as one. The effect of the 
disequilibrium situation in the housing market will be that a 
relatively large number of households with a strong preference for 
the n-th type of dweiling will still be searching, which gives rise 
to a larger fraction of searching households choosing the n-th type 
of dweiling than would be expected on the basis of the 
undifferentiated model. 
Furthermore, it may be the case that some actors anticipate future 
need by joining a queue before they are really in need of the choice 
alternative concerned. 
It may be concluded therefore that there are strong reasons to 
expect effects that counteract and perhaps compensate for the 
avoidance of alternatives wich have low realization probabilities 
associated with them. This has to be kept in mind in the 
specification and estimation of the actual model to which we now 
turn our attention. 
To see the consequences of these possible effect associated with 
queueing consider a steady-state situation in which in every period 
a number b of households starts searching for a particular type of 
dwelling and continues its search behaviour until this choice has 
been realized. Let us look at the consequences of this extremely 
consequent behaviour for the observed choice probabilities. 
Let JT be the probability that a household in the population of 
newly searching households prefers a dwelling of type n to all other 
dwellings and let ^ > be the realization probability. It will be 
assumed that the population of searching households is completely 
homogeneous. This implies that we would expect a fraction ir of the 
population to choose for alternative n in every period. (Serial 
correlation of the error terms is assumed to be absent). 
Now consider the situation in which all these households stick to 
a once chosen alternative. This implies that among the new searching 
households the fraction preferring a dwelling of a particular type n 
is still jr , but that the distribution of the other households , 
n 
that have already been searching for at least one period, is 
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influenced by the realization probabilities. In fact there is a 
number (l-il> ) .n .b left of households that have entered the 
n n 
2 
searching population one period ago, a number (1-V> ) .T .b of those 
that have entered two periods ago, etc. The total number of 
households searching for a dweiling of type n will therefore be 
equal to : 
E (l-i)r.f .b - ir.b/tf , (11) 
~ n n n n 
n=l,...,N . 
This means that the observed fraction of households choosing a 
dweiling of type n , n will not be equal to •K , but to : 
N 
7T° = (* b/tf )/< S * b/tf ) , (12) 
XX XL XX * .* XL XX 
n ' - l 
n = l , . . . , N . 
This means that for choice alternatives with a relatively small 
realization probability the observed fraction -n exceeds the 're-al' 
fraction ir , while for choice alternatives with a relatively large 
realization probability the reverse is the case. 
When the assumption that all households will continue joining one 
and the same queue until the alternative chosen by them has been 
realized it becomes more difficult to adapt the model to the case of 
queueing. It may e.g. , be assumed that in every period a fraction a 
of the searchers in the queue reconsider their decision (which is 
taken to means that they draw a new set of random terms to their 
utility functions , which is independent of the old one) , while the 
rest simply continues joining the queue. Again assuming a fixed 
inflow of new households in each period we find for the observed 
choice probabilities : 
N 
*°-(*/[i-°a-i>n)]/(.z*,/[i-<*a-i>.)]) , d3 ) 
XL XI XX • ^ XX XX 
n'-l 
n=»l, . . . , N 
which is a more cumbersome expression than (12). 
It should be remarked that the effects of queueing counteract 
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those of ar oidance of choice alternatives with a low realizatior 
probability as predicted by the model developed in chapter 3. This 
may be expected to make estimation of the avoidance effect more 
difficult. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In principle it is of course possible to model the choice 
behaviour of individual households in a market where queueing is 
relevant in a theoretically correct way, i.e., by developing the 
appropriate intertemporal choice model. In practice however, this 
route will be difficult to follow. First of all there is the problem 
of correlation among the error terms (these cannot be considered as 
independent since, during the waiting time, the household will 
always occupy its original dweiling. Second, one has to determine 
the waiting times for each of the dwelling types, which may not be 
an easy matter since the government may use priority schemes for 
various groups of searching households, while there also often 
exists a 'grey' market where waiting times can be much shorter. 
Third, this approach would make it desirable to model also the 
shoving process within the various queues and the differences in 
choice situations associated with the various places in the queue. 
These arguments make clear that it would not be an easy matter to 
model a market where pure queueing is the allocation mechanism in 
the appropriate way. In this situation the best one can do seems to 
be to adopt the model developed in chapter 3 for the analysis of 
actual housing markets , even though the situation in such markets 
is probably not characterized by pure uncertainty about the 
realization of alternatives chosen but also by queueing. This is the 
approach that will be adopted in the rest of this paper. 
6 Determination of the Realization Probabilities. 
6.1 Introduction. 
It has already been mentioned above that the housing market in the 
Netherlands , and especially the part of it that concerns rented 
dwellings, is characterized by persistent disequilibria. This gives 
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reason to suspect that the realization probabilities of intended 
moves are smaller than one in this part of the market, i.e., that 
there are a number of people willing to move house, but not able to 
do so. This is indeed the case and one of the uses of the above 
mentioned Housing Needs Survey is to get an estimate of the demand 
for dwellings on the basis of the stated preferences of the 
households. In the survey households are asked whether or not they 
consider to move house in the near future and what would be the 
desired characteristics of the new dweiling. 
Of course there may be doubts about the proper interpretation of 
the answers given to these questions. A very sceptical observer 
might say that a household may interpret this question as "If the 
land of Cocagne existed, what kind of dweiling would you prefer to 
live in ?". This would make the answers almost completely worthless 
for a trustworthy estimate of the demand for dwellings. On the other 
hand an observer might regard the answers to these questions as 
being based on proper information about the situation in the housing 
market , which would imply that the household is actively searching 
for exactly the kind of dweiling it indicates. Although the truth 
wil.1 probably be somewhere in the middle , we will show that the 
answers given in the above mentioned survey do not give the 
impression that the first extreme is very realistic. In the next 
subsections we will use the answers given to these questions in a 
way which comes close to the second extreme. This will not be done 
on the basis of a sound belief in its trustworthiness , but simply 
because no other way of proceeding with our analysis seemed to be 
possible. The fact that we have selected those households that 
indicated to be willing to move within a period of only one year may 
increase the validity of the approach-. 
What we would like to know is how many households that looked for 
a particular type of dweiling in a certain period succeeded in the 
realization of their intention. Since there exist no readily 
available figures about the numbér of households looking for a 
certain type of dweiling which are specific for the duration of 
search (ideally this should be longitudinal data) , we have to look 
for another method. What we will do is try to get an estimate of 
these probabilities by looking at the answers given to the questions 
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concerning the intention to move house. We will compare these to the 
retrospective questions (also contained in the Housing Needs 'Survey) 
concerning moving house in the preceding three years. This gives us 
an indication of the number of people that moved into a dwelling of 
any particular type in the preceding years and the number intending 
to do so in the near future. The difference bet-ween these figures 
will presumably give us some information concerning the numerical 
value of the realization probabilities. 
For this purpose we have used selected information on a subsample 
of the Housing Needs Survey held in 1981 containing a little more 
than 15,000 households in the three Western provinces of the 
Netherlands. We use the classification of the dweiling types that 
has been outlined in the preceding section. In the next two 
subsections we study the figures for the rented and the 
Table 3 Realized and Intended Moves for the Rented Sector. 
realized moves intended 
no. type rooms rent 
1978 1979 1980 1981 m O V e s 
1 single 1,2,3 < 250 21 23 18 21 42 
family 
unit 
2 
» * J f 250-450 10 7 16 10 121 
3 » t J i > 450 6 16 16 19 44 
4 4 < 250 17 21 8 15 30 
5 4 250-450 36 34 28 20 189 
6 4 > 450 24 26 34 42 107 
7 * 5 < 450 19 24 23 17 95 
8 £ 5 > 450 29 39 40 33 79 
9 apartment 1,2 < 250 52 51 54 45 53 
10 1,2 > 250 33 39 63 69 105 
11 3 < 250 48 50 57 31 91 
12 3 250-450 39 51 46 47 211 
13 3- > 450 11 23 38 34 47 
14 £ 4 < 250 35 26" 35 21 45 
15 ^ 4 250-450 81 67 73 64 150 
16 S: 4 > 450 40 33 59 47 65 
501 530 608 535 1,474 
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owner-occupied parts of the market. 
6.2 The Rented Sector 
For the 17 types of rented dwellings that have been distinguished 
the number of realized moves in 1978 , 1979 , 1980 and 1981 and the 
number of intended moves within a year have been listed in table 
10.2. 
The first remark that may be made about this table is that the 
number of moves into the various types of dwellings does not show a 
clear trend over time. The only exception to this general impression 
are the small apartments with a rent exceeding 250 guilders a month 
for which the number of moves increases steadily. The general 
impression is that neither the total number of movers into a rented 
dwelling, nor the distribution of this number over the various types 
shows a clear development over time. This seems to confirm empirical 
evidence given by Scholten et al.[1986] (see also Scholten[1988]) 
concerning the pattern of mobility on the Dutch housing market. 
It is also clear from the table that the number of intended moves 
is much larger than the number of realized moves. The figures about 
intended moves give little ground for the opinion that the 
households answered the questions about intended moves without any 
consideration of the existing situations on the housing market. The 
largest discrepancies occur for the medium rented types of dwellings 
(notably for the one family units) and not for the cheapest types. 
For our purposes it will be assumed that a household that 
indicated to be willing to move to a particular type of dwelling is 
Table 4 The Realization Probabilities, 
no. prob. no. prob. no. prob 
1 0.50 6 0.30 12 0.20 
2 0.10 7 0.20 13 0.55 
3 0.30 8 0.45 14 0.65 
4 0.50 9 0.95 15 0.50 
5 0.15 10 
11 
0.55 
0.50 
16 0.70 
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indeed looking for such a dwelling and will accept such a dweiling 
when it receives an offer. 
Furthermore it will be assumed that the number of households 
willing to move was approximately the same during 1978-1981 as it 
was at the time when the Housing Needs Survey was conducted. 
On the basis of these two assumptions the realization 
probabilities can be approximated by taking the ratio of the number 
of realized moves during 1978-1981 and the number of intended moves 
indicated in the Housing Needs Survey. The figures presented in 
table 10.4 are the ratios of the average number of households moving 
into a dwelling of a particular type during 1978-1981 and the number 
of intended moves. 
From table 10.4 it is obvious that the strongest rationing occurs 
for the medium-priced dwellings. The realization probabilities for 
the lowest and highest priced dwellings exceed those of the medium 
priced dwellings. Extremely small realization probabilities were 
found for the small and medium sized single family units with rents 
between 250 and 450 guilders a month. This may be regarded as an 
indication of strong disequilibria on the Dutch housing market. On 
the other hand however , this result may indicate some lack of 
reliability of the answers of the interviewees : a realization 
probability of only 10 % implies that on average a searching 
household has to look for quite a number of years before it can find 
a dwelling of the desired type. 
From the last column of table 10.3 it is also apparent that the 
pattern of number of searchers for the various types of dwellings 
is, to some extent, the mirror-image of the pattern of the 
realisation probabilities : choice frequencies are in general 
highest for the medium-priced types of dwellings. This gives a clear 
illustration of what has been called 'the paradox of the housing 
market' (see Priemus[1984]) : the highest preferred dwellings are 
the most difficult to obtain. Because of this phenomenon there is a 
clear negative correlation between the values of the realization 
probabilities and the choice frequencies . 
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6.3 The Owner-Occupied Sector 
The figures concerning the owner-occupied sector of the market are 
listed in table 10.5. They show a picture that differs a great deal 
from the one found for the rented sector. Between 1979-1981 the 
number of realized moves was steadily declining. Most probably this 
decline in the number of realized moves has been caused by the rapid 
decrease in the prices of owner-occupied dwellings around 1980 which 
marked the end of a long period of steadily increasing prices. 
The decrease in mobility seems to occur for all types and 
dwellings and the distribution over the various types did not seem 
to change much. Scholten et al.[1986] found the same result. 
Between 1978-1981 the number of realized moves exceeded the number 
of intended moves reported in the Housing Needs Survey. This 
indicates that also a decline in the number of intended moves has 
occurred. Only in 1981 the number of realized moves is below that of 
the intended moves. This may however , be regarded as a consequence 
of a return to a higher level of mobility after the shock of the 
earlier price decline and not as an indication of disequilibria. 
Since we have , from an a priori point of view , reason to expect 
that market disequilibria are much less important for the 'free', 
owner-occupied sector of the market than they are for the much more 
regulated rented one, it was decided to set all realization 
probabilities for this part of the market equal to 1, implying that 
every household intending to move to a particular type of owner -
occupied dweiling is able to do so within a period of one year. 
7 Specification and Estimation Results 
7.1 Introduction 
As has been stated in the introduction to the present chapter a 
two-step procedure will be used for the analysis of housing choices 
of individual households. At the top of the decision hierarchy is 
the decision whether to remain in the dweiling presently occupied or 
to move to another rented or owner-occupied dwelling. The second 
decision concerns the choice of the exact dwelling type. The 
decision tree is shown in figure 1 above. 
A bottom-up approach will be used for the estimation. We will 
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Table 5 Realized and Intended Moves for the Owner-Occupied 
Sector. 
, realized moves . __ , 
no. type rooms value mtende 
1978 1979 1980 1981 moves 
1 single 
family 
unit 
1,2,3 < 125 18 23 18 8 21 
2 . ï , 1,2,3 > 125 13 21 14 6 10 
3 » , 4 < 125 42 52 40 25 24 
4 
» ï 4 125-175 50 43 58 29 54 
•5 
, 1 4 > 175 35 32 41 25 17 
6 , > > 5 < 125 22 20 18 8 21 
7 l , > 5 125-175 59 50 44 41 43 
8 , » > 5 > 175 93 79 65 32 49 
9 apartment 1,2,3 all 23 55 44 29 18 
10 , > > 4 < 125 14 24 20 10 9 
11 , » > 4 > 125 7 8 9 9 12 
355 407 371 222 278 
first estimate the choice of the type of dwelling for households 
willing to move to a rented dweiling and for households willing to 
move to an owner-occupied dwelling. Second , we will estimate the 
decision to buy or to rent a dwelling or to continue the present 
situation. 
This nested approach to the estimation has the great advantage 
that the model can be split up in parts which are relatively easy to 
handle. Estimation of the complete model would concern 28 
alternatives, which is large, even for logit models. On the other 
hand the nested procedure is known to give rise to an 
underestimation of the Standard errors of the coefficients estimated 
for the higher stages of the decision process (see Amemiya[1978]). 
We have tried to specify the model in such a way that consistency 
with utility maximizing behaviour could be established. This means 
that we had to use the inclusivé values of the utility functions 
estimated at the lower stage as arguments in the utility functions 
of the higher stage. On the one hand this has the advantage (apart 
from the theoretical desirability of such a structure) of stressing 
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the relation between the various parts of the model , on the other 
hand the fact that this procedure does not give rise to a model for 
the willingness to move that can be used in its own right might be 
regarded as a drawback. We have chosen in favour of the theoretical 
arguments. Others (e.g. , Van Lierop[1986] and Rima and Van 
Wissen[1988]) have adopted the more practical approach. 
7.2 Specification of the Utility Function for the Rented Sector 
As pointed out above we start our empirical investigation by 
considering the people willing to move to a rented dwelling within a 
period of a year. The model to be used is the generalisation of the 
familiar multinomial logit specification of a discrete choice model 
dealt with in sectio 3 of the present paper. 
The indirect utility function that will be used as a starting point 
for the empirical analysis contains four collections of arguments : 
(i) household characteristics 
(ii) dwelling characteristics 
(iii)household income minus the costs associated with housing 
(i.e. , rent and costs of mobility) and 
(iv) an unobserved characteristic. 
Furthermore we will make use of the realization probabilities as a 
determinant of choice behaviour. 
From the first group we use (apart from income) only family size, 
which will be denoted as r. From the second group we use the number 
of rooms (s1) and the type of dwelling (s~). The latter is a dummy 
variable , which is equal to zero for a one-family unit and equal to 
1 for an apartment. Household income will be denoted - like before -
by y, the rent of the n-th type of dwelling as p . The unobserved 
variable is also a dwelling characteristic and will be denoted by 
s,. For the realization probabilities we use the symbol q . The 
indirect utility function associated with a move to the n-th type of 
dwelling of the i-th household in our sample can now be written in 
general form as : 
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ü . - ü ( r. , s, , s. , s, , y.-p ) . (14) 
ni n x 1 2 3 yi rn 
n-1, . . ., N , i-1 I 
The function U . contains only variables referring to the current 
period as its arguments. On the basis of the exposition given in 
chapter 9 it should however be clear that considerations with 
respect to the future are implicit in its formulation. It should be 
remarked also that the prices of other consumption goods and wealth 
have been suppressed in the present formulation. The prices of the 
consumption goods are (approximately) the same for all households in 
our sample and since we carry out a cross-section analysis the 
exclusion of this variable seems to be insignificant. The wealth 
variable should be expected to play a more important role, but since 
we have no data on it in our sample it was impossible to incorporate 
it in the analysis. However, this variable seems to be of more 
importance for the owner-occupied sector than for the rented sector. 
In the present section we will ignore it. 
In order to facilitate estimation, U has to be specified as a 
n r 
function that is linear in its parameters. In principle a (Taylor) 
approximation of any desired order can be used for this purpose, but 
in practice one often chooses a specification that is linear in the 
variables or in transformations of these variables (e.g., 
logarithms), as well as in the parameters. We will confirm to this 
convention and assume that the indirect utility function U . of (14) 
J
 ni 
is additively separable in its arguments : 
U1. - et - + o
 0.f (r.) + a ,.f (s, ) + a . .f (s.0) + ni nl n2 r ï n3 s, 1 n4 s. 2 
+ a _.f (s,) + a ,.f (y.-p ) , (15) 
n5 s, 3 n6 y w i rn 
n-1,...,N , i-1,...,I . 
To arrive at a further specification it may be observed that we 
have chosen our classification of the housing stock on the basis of 
the number of rooms (s..) , the type of the dwelling (s_) and its 
rent (which will, on the basis of the exposition of section 3 be 
used as an indicator for the unobserved variable s„). Since these 
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three variables appear elsewhere in the equation it seems to be 
better to make' a
 1 a constant which is not specific for the dweiling 
type, i.e., to assume a ^"a-, , n=l,...,16. The coëfficiënt a, cannot 
be estimated because of the translation invariance of the model. 
Second, one may doubt whether it is the number of rooms as such 
that should appear in the utility function or the number of rooms 
related in some way to the size of the household. The latter seems 
to be more appropriate. We may therefore use the ratio of the number 
of rooms and the number of persons in the household (s /r.) as an 
argument of the utility function , instead of both variables 
separately. Furthermore it seems that a low value of this variable 
has important negative effects on the utility attached to the 
particular choice alternative, but that a high value of it lacks the 
symmetrical large positive affects. For this reason a logarithmic 
transformation will be used. The coëfficiënt that will be estimated 
for this variable will be assumed to have the same value for all 
types of dwellings. 
Third, there seems to be no reason to use a transformation for the 
dummy variable s„ , or to assume that its coëfficiënt is type 
specific. 
Fourth, the variable s„ cannot be observed. For this reason we 
will make use of the hedonic price function of equation (3). It will 
be assumed that the price p is an increasing function of s,. 
Inverting this relation it follows that s_ is an increasing function 
of the observed price p . This inverted relation may be substituted 
into the indirect utilitiy function U . in order to arrive at a 
specification in which the price is substituted for the unobserved 
variable s„. We will use two specifications, in the indirect utility 
function, viz., the price itself and its logarithm. It should be 
remarked at this point however that the substitution of an inversed 
hedonic price function for the unobserved variable s. is not without 
problems from an econometrie point of view. To make this clear we 
consider the example of a linear relation between the price p and 
the unobserved quality aspect s_ : 
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Pn^ón^in-3 • (17) 
n-1 N . 
In this relation the term P' is dweiling-type specific and may 
therefore be expected to be dependent on the kind of dwelling 
concerned (single family unit or apartment) and on the number of 
rooms. Assuming again linearity, the complete function may be 
specified as : 
Pn = 'ó' + ^in-a3 + ^2n'Sl + Hn'a2 • (18> 
n-l,...,N , 
where all coefficients 0 are positive. "Inverting" this relationship 
by writing the unobserved variable s_ on the left-hand-side we 
obtain the following equation : 
J (19) 
n = l , . . . , N ï 
.«_. 6 i s p o s i t i v e . 
s_ - j8n + p. .sn + 0, . s. + p. .p 3 0 ^2n 1 ^3n 2 ^4n rn 
where p^ , p~ and p. are negative and p, 
Substitution of this relationship in the indirect utility function 
(20) does not only result in a positive relation between the value 
of indirect utility and the price of the dweiling concerned , but 
also in a negative relation betweeen this value and the variables s.. 
and s„. This implies that the sign of the coëfficiënt for the 
variable s„ becomes ambiguous as a consequence of the substitution 
of the inverted indirect utility function. The consequences for the 
variable s.. may be expected to be of smaller importance because it 
is incorporated in transformed form only. 
When the hedonic price function is specified in another way 
similar problems may be expected. Since there seems to be no way of 
avoiding them or to distinguish between the pure effect of the 
variables s.. and s„ and those introduced by the substitution of the 
inverted hedonic price function we will simply stick to the 
specification (20) after substitution of this relation. The 
coëfficiënt for the variable p (or its logarithmic transformation) 
will be allowed to vary with the dweiling type (i.e. , with the 
variables s.. and s„). This may be expected to mitigate the problems 
to some extent. 
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Finally we have income minus rent as an argument of the indirect 
utility function. We will incorporate this value also after 
logarithmic transformation. This formulation implies that a change 
in price or income becomes less important for the utility value 
attached to a particular type of dweiling when the income net of 
housing costs is already large and also that differences in rent 
become a less important determinant of housing choice when income is 
large. The coëfficiënt for this transformed variable will be assumed 
to be the same for all dweiling types. 
Summarizing, we arrive at the following specification of the 
indirect utility function : 
Uni = 70 + 71.log<s1/r1) + T ^ + 
+ 73n'Pn + V^VV • (20) 
i-1,...,1 , n-1,...,N , 
where instead of p we will also use log(p ). We expect 7 and 7_ to 
be positive and 7» to be negative. The coëfficiënt 7. is not 
c 
identified . With respect to the sign of 7- we should make a 
reservation however for two reasons. First, it may happen that the 
substitution of the inverted hedonic price function causes a reverse 
in the sign of this coëfficiënt. Second, the western part of the 
Netherlands contains four relatively large cities. People who have 
chosen to live there restrict their choice set since in these cities 
apartments are of far more importance than in the Netherlands, or 
even its three western provinces as a whole. The result may be a 
larger observed choice frequency for apartments. 
7.3 Effects of Uncertainty and Queueing 
The rented segment of the housing market appears to be heaviliy 
rationed (see section 10.3). The persistent state of disequilibrium 
may be expected to have two counteracting effects on the observed 
choice frequencies. First individual decision makers will be 
inclined to avoid the most heavily rationed choice alternatives in 
favour of the ones that are less rationed. Second , queueing may be 
expected to occur. 
In order to deal with the first effect we will use the model that 
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has been developed in chapter 3 will for the analysis of choice 
behaviour of households that intend to move to a rented dweiling. 
Since only movers are concerned here we can use the simple form of 
the model given in ( ), which will be rewritten as : 
ü1. 
Si<V"e 
= — . (11) 
N U1,. 
n —1 
i-1,....I , n-1,...,N 
This choice probability specification can be dealt with by choosing 
a particular specification for g.(.) and subsequently estimating 
ln(g.(.))+U . as if this were the utility function. The estimation 
°i ni J 
of the generalized logit model will then be possible in the same way 
as that of the usual logit model. We will make use of two possible 
specifications. The first specification that will be used is a 
simple power function of the realization probability : 
§iCV - V . (22) 
i=l I , n-1, . . . , N . 
The second is an exponential function of this probability : 
i ^V1* 
*l<*n ' U*i> = e • ( 2 3 ) 
i-1,...,1 , n-1,...,N 
We thus have : 
ln(g.(.))+UI. - «.ln(tf ) + U1. , (24) 
V6i ' m n ni 
i-1,...,! , n-1,...,N 
and 
ln(g.(.))+UI. - e.tf + e +U 1. , (25) 
&i ni rn ni 
i-l,...,N , n-1 N 
respectively. In both cases the linear character of the function to 
be estimated is preserved. In both cases the expected sign of the 
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coëfficiënt e is positive. 
Second, we have to take into account the possibility that queueing 
takes place for the alternatives that are rationed. The effects of 
queueing counteract those of rationing-avoiding choice behaviour. We 
may expect the longest queues for those dwellings that are most 
heavily rationed. It has been pointed out at the end of the previous 
chapter that queueing may be caused by deterministic variation 
(instead of the usually assumed stochastic instability) as a cause 
for the randomness of preferences, by unobserved heterogeneity among 
the households and by anticipating behaviour. In order to 
investigate the consequences of queueing we have to make assumptions 
about the way in which queueing takes place. Two special cases have 
been treated in section 5. It was first assumed there that a choice 
fc-r a particular type of dwelling would be maintained until it was 
realized, no matter how long the waiting time would be. On the basis 
of this assumption it was shown that in a stationary state the 
observed choice frequencies n would be equal to : 
N 
n n n , , n n. 
n'-l 
n-l,...,N , 
where n denotes the probabilty that an actor joining the queue 
chooses alterntive n. In this case it is easy to deal with the 
effect of queueing : instead of the function ln(g.(.))+U . (see 
(24) and (25)) one estimates : 
-ln(V»n) + ln(gi(.)) + U ^ , (27) 
n=l,...,N . 
In case of specification (22) this would simply imply that we expect 
e to be biased by a value -1. 
When a fraction a of the people in a particular queue continues 
searching, while the others reconsider their choices (see section 5) 
we have to estimate : 
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- ln[l-a(l-tfn)] + ln(gi(.)) + U ^ , (28) 
n-1,...,N , 
where a has to lie between 0 and 1. When a(l-i/> ) is very close to 
zero first logarithmic term may be approximated as -a(l-ij> ) . In case 
specification (23) is chosen we expect to estimate e-a instead of e 
as the coëfficiënt bef ore i>. 
When we adopt the still more general hypothesis that a may change 
with the length of the waiting time the relation between the 
theoretical (i.e., relevant for new searchers) and the observed 
choice frequencies becomes more complicated. Therefore this 
possibility will not be taken into consideration here. 
Another approach would be to eliminate the effects of queueing by 
concentrating on households that have been searching for a short 
period only. One would expect that among these people the effect of 
queueing is negligible. The drawback of this approach is obviously 
that it restricts the number of observations. For our estimations we 
have used both approaches. 
7.4 Results of Estimation 
We estimated utility function (20) with prices both taken up 
untransformed and logarithmic , corrected for possible effects of 
uncertainty (about the realization of the alternative chosen) by 
means of specifications (22) and (23). Since it seemed to be 
impossible to estimate the effects of queueing independent from 
those of avoidance of heavily rationed alternatives it has been 
assumed that the effects of queueing would be incorporated in the 
empirical estimates of e. For this reason e would be expected to be 
greater than -1 both in case of specification (24) and (25) , where a 
negative value of e would indicate that the effects of queueing were 
more important than those of avoidance of heavily rationed 
alternatives. It should be remarked that e could become smaller than 
1 when specification (23) is adopted and a.(l-ij> ) is not close to 
zero. 
Of the four specifications the one with the prices incorporated 
after logarthmic transformation and with specification (22) used 
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Table 10.5 Estimation Results for the Rented Sector. 
coëfficiënt variable duration of search 
all < 1 year < 6 months < 3 months 
no. of : rooms 
1 ,, / N 12.50 10.74 10.00 5.39 7^ in(, , ) 1 no. of persons (11.9) (5.9) (4.7) (1.8) 
72 type of c Lwelling 4.79 7.90 8.34 9.34 
(3.8) (3.3) (2.7) (2.1) 
7_.. ln(rent 1,2,3) 2.27 3.16 3.56 4.95 
(6.8) (5.5) (4.7) (4.4) 
7 3 2 ln(rent 4,5,6) 1.81 2.76 3.15 4.67 
(5.5) (4.9) (4.2) (4.1) 
7_, ln(rent 7,8) 1.33 2.38 2.81 4.53 
(4.0) (4.2) (3.7) (4.0) 
7,, ln(rent 9.10) 2.52 2.76 2.88 3.74 
(8.0) (5.2) (4.1) (3.6) 
7__ ln(rent 11,12,13) 1.63 2.00 2.28 3.46 
(5.4) (3.9) (3.4) (3.4) 
7 3 6 In(rent 14,15,16) 1.07 1.53 1.80 3.17 
(3.5) (3.0) (2.7) (3.1) 
7. ln(income - rent) 8.37 8.76 12.15 19.34 
M- (4.7) (2.9) (3.0) (3.1) 
e ln(real. prob.) -0.90 -0.88 -0.47 -0.15 
(-11.4) (-6.0) (-2.4) (-0.6) 
number of observations 1,108 371 
loglikelihood estimated model 
-2,801.5 -945.3 
2*(change in loglikelihood) 
541.1 166.7 
185 
76.4 
95 
-474.7 -244.5 
37.9 
for correction gave the most convincing results. The estimates of 
this variant are given in table 10.5. Estimates of the other 
variants can be found in the appendix to this paper. 
The equations were estimated for different compositions of the 
sample. First we did not select for the (realized) period of search, 
second we choose only those who had been searching for less than one 
year , third and fourth those who had been searching for less than 6 
months and less than 3 months. 
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Some remarks can be made with respect to these estimates. First , 
the coëfficiënt for the ratio between the number of rooms and the 
number of persons in the household is large and very significant. 
This indicates that this ratio, which should be expected to have a 
value that does not differ much from one, is an important 
determinant of housing choice. Changes in the number of persons in a 
household are closely related to stages in the life-cycle. These 
changes in household-demographic variables seem to be of great 
relevance for movements on the housing market. 
Second, the coëfficiënt for the dweiling type (a dummy for 
apartments) has not the expected negative sign. In it has already 
been pointed out that this may have been caused by perverse effects 
introduced by the substitution of the inverted hedonic price 
function in the model, or by the fact that relatively many people 
preferring to live in a city are incorporated in the sample.Third , 
the coefficients for the rents all have the expected positive sign. 
The coëfficiënt has a higher value for smaller dwellings. This may 
be interpreted as saying that in general for those dwellings 
unobserved quality aspects (i.e., other aspects than the type and 
the number of rooms) are more important than for larger ones. 
Fourth, the logarithm of the income net of housing costs also has 
the expected positive sign. In principle it would have been better 
to take the effects of individual housing subsidy into account in 
o 
the construction of this variable . This might have resulted in an 
even more significant coëfficiënt. Fifth , it is easy to compute 
that the maximum value of the utility function in the variable rent 
is reached when the ratio between rent and income is equal to 
7_,/(7_,+7,) , where the index k refers to the groups of housing 
types that have been distinguished. This implies that the maximum 
will be reached when the rent takes 10 - 20 per cent of total 
income , which seems quite realistic. 
Finally there is the coëfficiënt for the realization probability 
which has always a negative sign , indicating that the effects of 
queueing are far more important than those of avoidance of heavily 
rationed types of dwellings. In fact the lack of finding a positive 
value for the coëfficiënt e , even in the sample consisting only of 
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households that have been searching for less than three months , 
seems to indicate that there is no avoidance of heavily rationed 
types. The absolute value of the coëfficiënt e is higher when 
households that have been searching for a longer period are added to 
the sample , as it should be. The small differences between the 
values of this coëfficiënt for the sample containing all households 
and that containing only those that have been searching for less 
than a year may be regarded as an indication that many household 
reconsider their choice after they have been searching for one year. 
It can be inferred from the table that the coëfficiënt for the 
ratio between the number of rooms and the number of people in the 
household becomes larger when households have been searching for a 
longer period of time, while the coefficients for rent and income 
minus rent become smaller. It appears that households that have been' 
searching for a long period are willing to give in some of their 
financial desires, while their wishes with respect to the size of 
the new dweiling become more pronounced. 
In summary it may be said that the results of the estimation are 
in general satisfactory. 
7.5 The Owner-Occupied Sector 
For the owner-occupied sector we also used a specification of the 
utility function that was linear in the parameters to be estimated. 
The dummy for apartments and the ratio between the number of rooms 
and the size of the household were incorporated in the equation in 
the same way as was done for the rented segment of the market. The 
price was incorporated in the equation in a somewhat different way 
however. For households that move to an owner occupied dwelling from 
a rented one the (untransformed) price of the new dwelling would be 
the relevant variable. But households that owned a dwelling may 
regard the additional amount of money they have to pay (i.e., the 
difference between the prices of the old and new dwelling) as the 
appropriate variable for decision making. For both variables 
initially quality-aspects may dominate, while for higher prices the 
budget restriction becomes the more important variable. 
Empirically, the effects of unobserved heterogeneity turned out to 
be very pronounced for the price difference , but not for the 
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untransformed price. For this reasoti it was decided to incorporate 
the untransformed price in a linear way only , while the price 
difference was also incorporated squared. 
This suggests a specification of the following form : 
UL - a0 + «rl°g(Vri) + a2-S2 + a3n-Pn + 
* -k 9 
d..[a..(p -p.) + ac.(p -p.) ] , 1 L 4 ^*n *i 5 rn *i J 
(29) 
i-1,...,I , n-1,...,N , 
where d. is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the household 
* 
is owning a dweiling and equal to zero otherwise ; p. is the price 
of the present dweiling. 
An important variable that was still lacking in this specification 
is the wealth of the household. It should be expected that wealthier 
households are less senstive to the price than others. Since we had 
no information about the wealth of the households in our sample , it 
was decided to use current income as a proxy for this variable. It 
may be expected that for wealthier households the coëfficiënt for 
the price would be smaller and also that the function in square 
brackets in (29) would reach its maximum at a higher price 
difference. For this reason it was decided to make the coefficients 
a, and a^ dependent on income by specifying a_=/3„/y and a =-/3 /y. 
Another variable of potential relevance would be the interest rate 
for mortgage loans. The variation in this rate among the households 
in our cross-section sample may be expected to be small however. 
Since no figures about it were available in our data base it was 
omitted from the analysis. 
The final specification for our equation was therefore determined 
as : 
Uni - ^0 + /VlogCs^V + *r*l + *3n-PiAi + 
+ V [ / V(pn-p*) +/v<Pn-pJ>2/yi] 
(30) 
We expect /L and fi, to be.positive and 0- , 0- , n=l 5 , and 0-
to be negative. Results of estimation are shown in table 10.6. They 
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are satisfactory. The ratio between the number of rooms and the size 
of the household appears again as an important argument of the 
utility attached to a dweiling. The coëfficiënt for s~ is positive , 
but insignificant. The coefficients for the ratio between the price 
of the house and household income all have the expected sign and are 
significantly different from zero. The same is true for the price 
difference variables. 
Table 10.6 Results of Estimation for the Owner-Occupied Sector. 
coëfficiënt variable estimate (t-value) 
*i log(-
no. of rooms 
no, of persons ) 5.40 (4.6) 
type 0.11 (0.2) 
'31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
price.. /income 
price„/income 
price~/income 
price,/income 
price /income 
-9.52 ( -7 .1 ) 
•11.81 ( -10 .3) 
•13.27 ( -10 .3) 
-8 .79 ( -5 .7 ) 
•14.56 ( -7 .2 ) 
fi, price difference 4.39 (13.8) 
£c 
(price difference)' 
income 
•5.03 (-2.2) 
number of observations 
loglikelihood 
2*(change in loglikelihood) 
282 
•278.3 
795.9 
7.6 The First Stage of the Decision Process 
The estimation results of the submodels for choice among the 
various rented and owner occupied types of dwellings are used in the 
estimation of the submodel for the first stage of the decision 
hierarchy. In this stage the households are assumed to choose one of 
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three alternatives : 
(i) continue the present situation 
(ii) move to a rented dweiling 
(iii)move to an owner-occupied dweiling. 
The utility of alternative 1 is in principle equal to that of the 
dweiling type presently occupied by the household as estimated in 
one of the submodels discussed in the previous subsections. But 
since the resistance toward making a move was expected to be large 
(partly as a consequence of the costs associated with moving) it was 
decided to add a constant to this utility value in order to deal 
with this inertia. Furthermore it was hypothesized that the 
resistance against making a move would be larger for households 
owning the dweiling presently occupied then for those renting their 
present dweiling. To take this effect into account a dummy variable 
was introduced. The utility of continuation of the present situation 
was therefore specified as : 
* 
U.n - a + a., .U . + a„ + a_.d , (30) 
il o 1 si 2 3 
where U. is the utility of the dweiling presently occupied as 
estimated in the submodels discussed above and d is a dummy for 
owner-occupiers. The incorporation of the terms a_ and a„.d 
introduces the kind of state dependence that was discussed in 2.4.5 
in the model. 
The utility of moving to a rented dweiling is equal to the highest 
utility value that could be reached when such a move would be 
undertaken. This maximum obtainable utility is given by the 
* 
inclusive value of these Utilities, which will be denoted as U . and 
ri 
is defined as follows : 
* 16 U1. 
U r i - log{ S e n l ) . (31) 
n=l 
We thus have for the utility of moving to a rented dwelling : 
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U.„ - an + a..U*. . (32) 
i2 O 1 ri 
The utility of moving to an owner-occupied type of dwelling is 
basically equal to the inclusive value for the choice alternative of 
this segment of the market : 
* 11 U1. 
UQi - log{ 2 e n l } . (33) 
n=l 
Two additional terms were introduced for this choice alternative 
however. First it was hypothesized that households already owning a' 
dweiling would be more inclined to choose again for such a dwelling 
if they made a move than others. For this reason a dummy variable 
was introduced. Second, it seems probable that owning a dwelling is 
most attractive for households with a high income. This motivates 
the introduction of income as a determinant of the utility of moving 
to an owner-occupied type of dwelling. We thus arrive at the 
Table 7 Results of Estimation for the First Stage of the Decision 
Process. 
coëfficiënt variable estimate (t-value) 
a- inclusive value 0.079 (8.5) 
a constant (for alt. 1) 2.241 (31.7) 
a- dummy for owning (for alt. 1) 5.202 (11.4) 
a, dummy for owning (for alt. 3) 1.949 (5.9) 
a income (for alt. 3) 0.039 (3.8) 
number of observations 3,461 
loglikelihood -1,319.0 
2*(change in loglikelihood) 4,966.6 
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frllowing specification : 
U_. - aA + ot. .U*. + o-.d + a,.y. . (33) 
3i 0 1 oi 5 6 u 
Results of estimation are shown in table 7. 
The coëfficiënt for the inclusive values and the utility of the 
dwelling presently owned as determined in the relevant submodel of 
the second stage of the decision process is positive and smaller 
than 1. This implies that the model is consistent with utility 
maximizing behaviour. All coefficients have the expected sign. It 
appears from the values of the estimates that the resistance against 
making a move is strong in view of the large values of the 
coefficients a_ and a, as compared to that of a- . Large differences 
between the inclusive values of renting or buying a(nother) dwelling 
are needed in order to make it attractive to move. The resistance 
against moving is especially strong for households that own a 
dwelling. 
The coefficients a„ and a, can be interpreted as reflecting the 
costs associated with making a move. These include the monetary 
costs of moving, but also the psychic and social costs and the 
efforts and time needed to make a move. It appears from table 10.7 
that these costs are so high that most households would prefer to 
stay where they are , even if a significant increase in utility 
could be reached by making a move. Such potential increases in 
utility hardly increase the probability of moving , although the 
effect is statistically significant. 
The coefficients a. and a_ indicate that households that own a 
4 5 
dwelling and households that earn a high income are more inclined to 
choose an owner-occupied dwelling than other households. This 
confirms our expectations. 
9 Conclusion 
The estimation results that have been reported on in the preceding 
section make it clear that the prices and the quantity rationing 
both have a significant influence on the size and the composition of 
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the population of households searching for another dweiling. The 
effects of the prices concern the choice behaviour of these 
households. The effects of the quantity rationing do not seem to 
influence choice behaviour, but cause queueing and by means of this 
an increase in the number of searching households. It appears that 
households are willing to wait for a relatively long time (at least 
a year) for the realization of their preferred type of dweiling. 
The estimation results that have been obtained are quite 
satisfactory. They show that it is perfectly possible to use 
economie theory as a device for modelling choice processes on the 
housing market. 
The model for housing choice that has been specified and estimated 
in this chapter can be used within the broader framework of a 
meso-economic housing market model. In such a model the effects of 
changes in the prices and in the realization probabilities on the 
distribution of the population of households over the housing stock 
can be studied. Such simulation exercises would be especially useful 
however if we also had an empirical model for household formation 
and dissolution at our disposal. Starting households are a very 
important group of demanders on the housing market. Simulation 
exercises that concern only households that are already 
participating in the market seem to be of limited value. Since we 
have not developed an empirical model of household demography in the 
present study such a broad approach was out of the question here. 
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Notes 
* I am grateful to Kees Gorter for assistance during an early stage 
of the research reported on in this paper. 
1 Scholten[1988] shows however that the recruitment patterns did not 
change significantly during 1977-1981. This gives some 
justification to the use of his approach for that period. 
2 Other studies have used different regional boundaries. E.g. Rima 
and Van Wissen[1988] used the greater Amsterdam area (including a 
part of the province of Flevoland), Scholten[1988] distinguished 
the three largest towns of the Rimcity as a separate entity. 
3 It may be remarked that the boundaries chosen for the prices of 
owner occupied dwellings are close to thos used for some subsidies 
for those dwellings. 
4 One may object that in (11) alternative n(i) should be left out of 
consideration. However, by using specification (11) we allow for 
the possibility that a household searches for the same type of 
dweiling, possibly in another part of te study area. This seems to 
be realistic and for this reason alternative n(i) is also 
included. 
5 Estimation of the logit model ir =»(V> ) /%(•$ ,) gives rise to a very 
significant estimate of a equal to -0.58 with a t-ratio equal to 
-14.5 , which causes a decrease in the loglikelihoo of 99.6. 
6 The relation between the /3's and the (fi')'s is easy to determine. 
7 This is caused by the translation invariance of the model. 
8 The Individual Housing Subsidy is probably the most important 
subsidy used for the Dutch housing market. It gives an 
income-dependent contribution to the housing costs of the 
lower-income groups. See Van der Schaar[1987] for details. 
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Appendix Estimation Results of the Other Variants for the Rented 
Sector 
In this appendix we present the estimation results for the other 
three variants of the model used in the text for explaining the 
choice of a dwelling type for households willing to move to a rented 
dwelling. 
Table Al. Prices logarithmic , realization probability 
untransformed. 
coëfficiënt variable duration of search 
all < 1 year < 6 months < 3 months 
no. of rooms 
7i ln( ï 
1 no. of persons 
7 2 type 
731 ln(rent 1,2,3) 
7 3 2 ln(rent 4,5,6) 
7-„ ln(rent 7,8) 
7 3 4 ln(rent 9,10) 
73 ln(rent 11,12,13) 
7„, ln(rent 14,15,16) 
11.99 10.22 9.80 5.37 
(11.5) (5.6) (4.6) (1.8) 
3.84 6.13 7.55 8.94 
(3.1) (2.8) (2.6) (2.1) 
2.09 2.91 3.44 4.92 
(6.3) (5.1) (4.5) (4.4) 
1.63 2.53 3.04 4.64 
(5.0) (4.5) (4.0) (4.1) 
1.17 2.15 2.70 4.50 
(3.5) (3.8) (3.6) (4.0) 
2.46 2.76 2.89 3.77 
(7.7) (5.1) (4.1) (3.6) 
1.59 2.02 2.28 3.49 
(5.2) (3.9) (3.3) (3.4) 
1.07 1.59 : 82 3.21 
(3.5) (3.1) (2.7) (3.1) 
8.46 9.15 12.30 19.60 
(4.7) (3.0) (3.0) (3.2 
-2.81 -2.48 -1.33 -0.28 
(-11.0) (-5.5) (-2,2) (-0.4) 
1,108 371 185 95 
807.3 949.0 475.3 244.6 
7, ln(income - rent) 
e realization prob. 
number of observations 
loglikelihood 
2 times change in loglikelihood 
529.4 159.2 75.3 37.7 
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Table A2. Prices Untransformed , Realization Probability 
Logarithmic. 
coëfficiënt variable composition of the sample 
all < 1 year < 6 months < 3 months 
ln(-
no. of rooms 
no. of persons 
type 
rent 1,2,3 
rent 4,5,6 
rent 7,8 
rent 9,10 
rent 11,12,13 
rent 14,15,16 
ln(income - rent) 
ln(real. prob.) 
number of observations 
loglikelihood 
2 times change in loglikelihood 
534.8 
r31 
r32 
r33 
r34 
r35 
r36 
3.84 2.16 1.66 -0.76 
(7.3) (2.3) (1.3) (-0.5) 
1.96 2.50 2.27 2.23 
(7.2) (4.7) (3.3) (2.3) 
1.10 1.32 1.34 1.84 
(10.4) (7.2) (5.5) (4.9) 
1.07 1.37 1.36 1.91 
(10.9) (8.2) (6.1) (5.4) 
0.90 1.34 1.38 2.08 
(8.6) (7.7) (6.0) (5.7) 
1.50 1.42 1.22 1.45 
(10.9) (5.9) (4.5) (3.0) 
0.91 1.01 1.03 1.50 
(9.1) (5.9) (4.5) (4.3) 
0.81 1.07 1.07 1.69 
(8.0) (6.3) (4.7) (4.8) 
17.88 19.28 20.79 30.83 
(9.1) (5.8) (4.7) (4.4) 
-1.26 -1.39 -1.04 -0.96 
(-15.4) (-9.0) (-5.1) (-3.3) 
1,108 371 185 95 
2804.6 -931.2 -469.4 -234.7 
194.9 87.1 57.5 
A few comments are in order. First , when the realization 
probability is incorporated untransformed it is alway smaller than 
1 , probably indicating that the term a. (1--0 ) is usually too large 
to be a good approximation for ln[a.(l--0 )]. (This is confirmed by 
the value of e close to -1 in the variant reported in the text). 
Second , when prices are incorporated untransformed it is easy to 
compute that the maximum of the utility as a function of rent is 
reached when the income minus rent is equal to 7,/7„, , where the 
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Table A3. Prices and Realization Probabilities Untransformed. 
coëfficiënt variable duration of search 
all < 1 year < 6 months < 3 months 
ln(-
no. of rooms 
no. of persons 
type 
rent 1,2,3 
rent 4,5,6 
rent 7,8 
rent 9,10 
rent 11,12,13 
rent 14,15,16 
ln(income - rent) 
realization prob. 
number of observations 
loglikelihood 
2 times change in loglikelihood 
512.4 
r31 
r32 
'33 
'34 
r35 
r36 
2.84 0.67 0.59 -1.92 
(5.1) (0.7) (0.4) (-1.1) 
1.41 1.63 1.75 1.73 
(5.7) (3.5) (2.9) (2.0) 
0.97 1.13 1.21 1.72 
(9.5) (6.4) (5.1) (4.8) 
0.97 1.23 1.28 1.85 
(10.1) (7.7) (5.9) (5.4) 
0.84 1.27 1.35 2.07 
(8.2) (7.4) (5.9) (5.7) 
1.36 1.23 1.08 1.33 
(9.9) (5.1) (3.2) (2.8) 
0.87 0.97 0.99 1.48 
(8.6) (5.6) (4.3) (4.2) 
0.88 1.17 1.15 1.78 
(8.5) (6.7) (4.9) (4.9) 
17.98 19.48 20.98 31.24 
(9.2) • (5.9) (4.5) (4.2) 
-3.78 -4.05 -3.16 -2.97 
(-15.7) (-8.8) (-5.1) (-3.4) 
1,108 371 185 95 
,815.8 -935.8 -469.8 -234.4 
185.7 86.3 58.1 
index k refers to the groups of types that have been taken together. 
This implies that the maximum would be reached when income - rent 
equals 1,500 - 2,000 guilders a month , which seems to be 
unrealistic for the higher incomes. Third , when prices are 
incorporated untransformed the effect of the ratio between the 
number of rooms and the household size becomes less important and 
sometimes (for the smaller samples) insignificant. Also for this 
specification the coëfficiënt for the realization probabilities 
becomes significantly more negative than it was when prices were 
48 
incorporatei after logarithmic transformation. In two cases the 
coëfficiënt for the logarithm of these probabilities becomes 
(significantly) smaller than -1 , which is hard to expiain otherwise 
than as the result of a specification error. The same amounts to the 
fact that in two cases the coëfficiënt for the realization 
probability is significantly negative for the sample consisting of 
households that have been searching for at most three months. 
(Remember also the negative correlation between the realization 
probabilities and the choice frequencies mentioned in 5.4). These 
remarks indicate the reasons why we have chosen the variant in which 
both the prices and the realization probability are transformed 
logarithmically. 
